

12-9-06

Talk with Eileen

Test
Taylor Panel:

In favor of abolition?

Eileen

as Haberman (verbally)

Shirley Wilkins

+ Tamm

Tamm

+ C

a paper

Mr. York

(Stan Tamm?)

McN?

Lee Butler

MHH?

Carter?

(ask Hersh)

Hartshorn?

Humph?

HAR/W studies (WSSM-3) study that appeared
N

My burial docs

My available docs GEOP

1109

~~RR~~ R 660

R 290

12-19-06

Book

New Uses under-appreciated

* Kura 1950, 51, 55

NSC

* — Jarvis Strands 1954-55
1958

MHC

* — Bay 1956

— Lebanon - Kuwait 1958 sent

— Carter 1980 sent

and Fares
Jamil,

* — C-II (:) McN

Anderson
me

* — Kde Bank 1968

clips

* — DBP 1954

N

* & mixed

* N 1969

new does

* N 1972

" "

Does:

Dalya

1969 about

C-II

Draft introduction, etc., to nuclear book.
TR?

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush raised the specter of an alliance of terrorist groups and rogue regimes, armed this time with thermonuclear weapons. Bush argued that we could not let nuclear weapons fall into the wrong hands, where the world's most dangerous regimes have the world's most dangerous weapons. In building support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, nothing was more effective than the Bush administration's argument that we didn't want the next smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud. In the post 9-11 world, the Bush administration and its allies argued, we couldn't afford to wait, lest the next attack against the US be one with nuclear weapons.

Of course, we now know that the argument that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear capability was based on false intelligence and conscious deception of the public at the highest levels, as was the idea that Iraq would turn over such destructive capability, in the unlikely event it did acquire it, to its sworn enemies Al Qaeda. And with the failure to find nuclear weapons or other "weapons of mass destruction" in Iraq, public concern with the nuclear threat appears to have declined again, even in the face of reports that the Bush administration is considering attacking Iran – including through the possible use of nuclear weapons – to prevent that country from acquiring a nuclear capability.

What has thus been overlooked in all this is that the invasion of Iraq was one of the first nuclear wars, in the specific sense that this was the first time the US invaded a country by arguing that it was on the verge of getting or had already reconstituted its nuclear capability, the argument being that the US needed to attack Iraq lest Iraq or its ostensible terrorist allies launch a surprise attack against the US with nuclear weapons. And as US policy towards Iran shows, increasingly the US counter-proliferation policy includes the option of preventing adversaries of the US from acquiring nuclear weapons, if need be through US military actions against these states. To be sure, the failures of this policy can already be seen in the recent North Korean nuclear test, only after which did the US articulate that it would not attack North Korea, an assurance the regime had long been seeking and which was surely one of the reasons for its desire to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent. US policy then, of relying on the threat of military force to deter the acquisition of nuclear weapons to powers it considers adversarial, however unevenly applied, is dangerous in the extreme, and will likely encourage, not discourage, proliferation. The likely result of pursuing such a policy will be similar enough to the effects of Hurricane Katrina on the Gulf Coast of the US, as city after city is destroyed by nuclear weapons. The only difference is that whereas Katrina was a force of nature destroying cities, supplemented, as it were, by the effects of human-made global warming induced by greenhouse gas emissions thought to increase hurricane intensity, from the era of strategic bombing up through the nuclear era leaders planned to do what Hurricane Katrina did, namely, to destroy cities, as evidenced in the rain of destruction from Dresden to Nagasaki. And like Katrina, such an outcome – the destruction of city after city – will have been both predictable and predicted.

The Bush administration is not wrong to highlight the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Yet in highlighting the dangers of proliferation, one does not have to suppose, as the Bush administration seems to do, that new countries acquiring nuclear weapons for the first time will be any more dangerous than those countries that have

already acquired nuclear weapons. Instead, one only has to assume that the new nuclear powers will be just as reckless and dangerous as the already constituted nuclear powers. To understand just how dangerous nuclear weapons in human hands are, even the "right hands," requires a new look at the still largely secret history of the nuclear era. Here, the Bush administration's focus on the dangers of nuclear weapons getting into the wrong hands invites us towards a closer look at the dangers of nuclear weapons in the "right hands," namely our hands, and those of our adversaries and allies, throughout the nuclear era, as a way of highlighting the real dimensions of the present nuclear threat and the urgent need to address the challenge this presents to humanity in the 21st century.

[Suggestion: Now put in your bringing of your own unique perspective as someone who came to work on war plans and studied command and control. Deal with question of how somebody so opposed to nuclear weapons and killing of innocents came to be working on nuclear plans (fear of missile gap, Soviet surprise attack). And earlier concerns with preventing catastrophe. Perhaps mention relatively early knowledge, unknown to others (after revelations of missile gap, which it turns out was based on intelligence of Air Force, as you mentioned, and related fear of a surprise nuclear attack just as wrong as intelligence on WMD's in Iraq) of the first strike preemptive character of US warplans. Unlike others, who came to the problem after Soviet buildup rationalized our own stance. Perhaps put in here learning in 1974 about nuclear threat plans for Vietnam and how you thus eventually came to realize both the reality of US early superiority, contrary to most others, and long history of US nuclear threats. And presage later discussion by perhaps mentioning your early work on risk, decisionmaking and uncertainty, and threats, madman theory.] Then lay out how this book will be part memoir, part analysis, first going into your personal experience, including with nuclear weapons, from let's say the accident, if you want to put this in, up until learning about the reality of the missile gap in '61, the revelations about Duck Hook threats in '74, and then backtracking into the analysis part of the book, starting with strategic bombing, and supplemented with memoir like material as necessary.]

The material presented herein flies in the face of arguments stressing a supposed nuclear taboo, which has ostensibly prevented leaders from using nuclear weapons. Whatever the merits of this approach, what this history obscures is how nuclear weapons *have been* used by leaders, both through *nuclear threats* and through *explicit declaratory doctrines* – for example Eisenhower's massive retaliation policy and NATO's first use doctrine, the latter basing the defense of Western Europe on an explicit alliance commitment to use nuclear weapons to fend off a possible Soviet conventional assault. Moreover, the material, based both on my personal experience in nuclear matters and a lifetime of studying about these problems, may have special relevance for the period we are entering. For it comes at a time when some analysts are warning about the dangers of a new era of US nuclear superiority, replete with a US first strike capability. As Lieber and Press argue, "new research on the political utility of nuclear superiority and the strength of the nuclear taboo is needed. Unfortunately, the end of the Cold War diminished interest in these questions just as high-quality data on decision-making during nuclear crises became available in historical archives." One of the key questions raised by their work is that of "bargaining leverage...whether gains outweigh the dangers..." It so happens that I have specialized, both as a government official and as a private researcher, on studying nuclear crises, knowledge supplemented by my own participation

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Threats

in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The material presented here thus offers much food for thought not only about previous eras of US nuclear superiority and the one we may be entering, but also new perspectives on the dangers of nuclear planning and nuclear war in the era of relative parity. While taking much from previous research, this book offers nothing less than a new perspective on the nuclear era, one which hopefully can make some meaningful contribution to public debate and thus to ending the nuclear era's unprecedented dangers.

12-24-6

from 1958-61

& worked on a
problem/diagnosis
delirious as

SA's WMD's

1991/94-2003

ETCS a want
man (genius) who by
going through cases
to questions could
verify correct someone
submitted a person they
were talking to a computer
(Milton Friedman; Tom F?)

12-24-06

Wf 60 years,
no explosion?

- No SU ICAMS,
US Sup for 1945-65
(that was a delivery)
- SH didn't have WMOs
- (we didn't kill b in
1991)

12-24-06

Think of a book
like Bundy's —
not wif we won't
close but how we
were...

limits of anti-rac
offices — Mc6 B, McH
(Oppie, King,

still find it necessary
to discuss the fabric
on how against the risk
even, how close
(how applicable to
buses, colleges, thems.

12-24-6

TR: I'm wrong
that a new
book can't sell -
because terrible
events are going
to take place

("I presume that
just before or after
this is initial terrible
events will occur -
people will want to
know, how did this happen,
how do we get out,

what/who has to
change? How?

(Franklin Miller,
Admiral — ...)

Dems!

Not just Bush —
as a flag!

TR: increasingly,
the new justification
for an use policies
(encouraging ^{use} hostif & FO)
will be, "preventing hostif."^{PH}